Suppose I know that next Christmas my mother will cook dinner for me. I am certain of it, and in fact I know it. Knowledge has three requisites: belief, reason for belief, and correctness of belief. Very few would deny that I in fact know that my mother will cook dinner for me next Christmas. Perhaps it could be argued that I do not know this absolutely, but if we should make the rules for knowledge that strict we are arguing epistemology. In order to avoid a digression that will probably not bear real fruit to our discussion and make us either solipsists or bring us right back to where we are, let us grant that I know my mother will cook dinner for me next Christmas. For the point is this: that the fact that I know this does not take the freedom from my mother, who freely chooses to cook me that dinner. We may argue till the cows come home whether I can actually know the future; but the point is that, should we suppose I do know this, my knowledge does not take the freedom from my mother and her free choice. Thus, a given event can be true and certain, without being determined. God too was certain from the beginning of time that my mother would cook me dinner last Christmas; but the mere fact of his knowledge did not take the freedom from my mother's choice to cook me dinner, any more than my own knowledge of this event takes the freedom from my mother's choice.
