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Emerging US paradigm for Afghanistan, implications for Pakistan[/h] Posted on August 18, 2011
Shamsa Ashfaq
After 9/11, US launched the ‘shock and awe’ crusade against Taliban with a hope to defeat them and consolidate hold over Afghanistan. Unfortunately, US failed to achieve its objective as Taliban proved more resilient than expected and refused to give up concession unless the occupation forces leave Afghanistan. By and large, the US impending defeat in Afghanistan is fast emerging as a ground reality and defeat at the hands of the rag-tag Taliban is turning into the greatest embarrassment for the sole superpower of the world. Instead of accepting the reality and working out a strategy involving all stake holders for a negotiated settlement, the US has opted for bizarre arrangements that include back door negotiations with Taliban and the troops’ withdrawal from Afghanistan. Here it is important to mention that Afghanistan is Pakistan’s backdoor, and its evolution is a matter of fundamental interest to Pakistan. The United States can choose to leave Afghanistan without suffering strategic disaster but Pakistan cannot. Pakistan can neither leave its borders with Afghanistan nor can it evade the reality that Pakistani ethnic groups particularly the Pakhtun, who straddle the border and form the heart of the Taliban phenomenon, live on the Afghan side of the border as well. Therefore, while Afghanistan is a piece of American global strategy, it is central to Pakistan’s national strategy. Hence, any strategic or tactical shift in the US war plan in Afghanistan has invariably serious implications for Pakistan and the downward spiraling Pak-US relations. The drawdown will mainly create three facts. First, Pakistan will be facing the future on its western border with Afghanistan without an American force to support it. Secondly, as Pakistan moves to limit US access to its military infrastructure (Shamsi airbase etc.) and to reduce its intelligence and security presence inside Pakistan, the US is likely to enhance its troop presence and bases on the eastern Pak-Afghan border. Pakistan will likely see an intensification of drone strikes in North and South Waziristan and even an expansion of the strike coverage to Kurram and Mohmand agencies. Thirdly, as the US draws down, it will need Pakistan to cover its withdrawal strategically. But Afghanistan is not Iraq and as the US forces draw down; Afghanistan will be in greater danger. After the US withdrawal Taliban will ultimately gain control over Afghanistan as they had the bitter experience of US betrayal since 1990 and trust only in themselves, to form a broad-based government. Lastly, this eastward shift of US’ battlefront will cast its shadow on fragile and reversible peace process. Worth mentioning is the fact that already talks between US and the Taliban representatives have collapsed on the pretext of leaking of the details of the negotiations and disclosing the identity of the Taliban’s chief negotiator Tayeb Agha, former private secretary of Taliban leader Mullah Omar. Despite such a development, the US is likely to continue the operating strategy of talking and fighting at the same time. Now the US will continue to pick and choose those Taliban groups that it considers reconcilable and it certainly does not include Haqqani network. However, the situation dictates that Haqqani be allowed to join the peace process considering this group central to any lasting peace settlement. If the divergence between the two countries continues to persist over which Taliban groups to be or not to be made party, the Pak-Afghan border is going to remain volatile. In view of these realities, two things are evident. One, the operational environment is not favourable for US strategy. There is extreme hostility within Afghanistan and the neighbouring countries, particularly Pakistan and Iran. Two, the United States and Pakistan need each other especially the US, as she could not possibly operate in Afghanistan without Pakistani support, ranging from the use of Karachi and the Karachi-Khyber and Karachi-Chaman lines of supply to the collaboration on intelligence sharing on Al-Qaeda. So it is clear that the US’ military solution to Afghanistan problem has failed and is not likely to bear the desirable results in the future as well. The Americans will, therefore, have to exit from Afghanistan and sooner the better it would be. But before leaving, the strategy should not be to leave Pakistan with a situation as that of 1990. At the same time, it is important for Pakistan to realize that after the US exits it is Taliban who are going to gain control over Afghanistan as they consider themselves to be the only viable course to secure peace in Afghanistan. So Pakistan ought to pursue the policy of engagement with major Taliban factions in order to be well placed to take on the situation as the US forces leave the Afghan theatre.