Ze Frank: The History of Afghanistan in 3 Minutes
- Thread starter boombala
- Start date
Users who are viewing this thread
-
28Replies
-
697Views
-
0Participant count
-
Participants list
Obama says he will not rush Afghanistan decision
Obama says he will not rush Afghanistan decision - Forbes.com
Obama says he will not rush Afghanistan decision - Forbes.com
Yeah, lets not rush anything. Let fuck around for 6 more months and get more troops killed for no clear objective before we decide whether to shit or get off the pot.
Half assed measures and indecision are not going to do anything but get troops killed for no good reason. We're at a fork in the road and we either need to commit, go all in and give it our best shot at turning that hellhole into a stable state, or take our ball and go home.... :thumbdown
Half assed measures and indecision are not going to do anything but get troops killed for no good reason. We're at a fork in the road and we either need to commit, go all in and give it our best shot at turning that hellhole into a stable state, or take our ball and go home.... :thumbdown
Minor Axis
Well-Known Member
I'm looking in a mirror...
Oct. Deadliest Month For U.S. In Afghanistan
Looks like the insugents are a buffer for the Talibans.
Looks like the insugents are a buffer for the Talibans.
The way you win against a guerrilla insurgency is with numbers, classically to the tune of a 10:1 ratio of your forces to theirs.
In a situation where guerillas have little or no outside state support like Afghanistan, the only way they can operate is through the cooperation and support of the local populace.
You put in place large numbers of troops to provide security for the populace and build up infrastructure (the old winning hearts and minds) reducing their support amongst the populace while at the same time you deny them the ability to maneuver and organize in the open.
If you have the willpower to do that for long enough, the insurgency will die. If you don't have the willpower to do that, you may as well GTFO now because you'll just lose later with half ass measures.
In a situation where guerillas have little or no outside state support like Afghanistan, the only way they can operate is through the cooperation and support of the local populace.
You put in place large numbers of troops to provide security for the populace and build up infrastructure (the old winning hearts and minds) reducing their support amongst the populace while at the same time you deny them the ability to maneuver and organize in the open.
If you have the willpower to do that for long enough, the insurgency will die. If you don't have the willpower to do that, you may as well GTFO now because you'll just lose later with half ass measures.
Thats too simplistic. You cant wipe out the insurgency even with 10:1. The insugents can easily match the ratio proportionately. The insurgents are there cuz of the presence of US troops let alone the large number of volunteers from foreign countries fighting along with Talibans
:24: That's hilarious. I'm sure we've learned nothing from the last 6 years in Iraq and more than that in Afghanistan. Plus that little Vietnam thing a while back. And, get this: our military studies other military's tactics too. Guerilla warfare is nothing new, it's been around forever, and it's been beaten before. Nova's pretty much spot-on with his comments.
This might be the smartest post I've ever seen you make :nod:
I put it simply but the details of the theory are far more complex.
Where you go off the rails is the assumption that your forces are there to wipe out the insurgents. That tactic is what the Russians tried and thats part of what got their ass kicked. Its also the same reason we got sent packing from Vietnam. You don't squash an insurgency, you squeeze it, you suffocate it.
You have to drop that thinking in order to to turn the strengths of an insurgency into weaknesses and prevail. Namely you have to play off the fact that an insurgency can not engage a conventional force in a head on engagement and win.
All military operations require several key ingredients.
1. Men
2. weaponry and supplies
3. Room to maneuver
From Ceasar's Legions up to a modern armored division, every fighting force in the history of mankind has needed those 3 ingredients to wage battle.
The 10:1 ratio allows the conventional force to take and hold territory as there's precious little the smaller insurgent force can do. As I said before, by definition, an insurgency isn't strong enough to fight in a head on full out battle and retake the territory. Holding territory denies the insurgency #3. Without the ability to maneuver freely and openly, you lose the ability to organize significant attacks, severely reducing the impact of the insurgency. This allows for the next part of the process.
For the most part insurgencies get #1 and #2 from the populace at large, either through cooperation or intimidation. As you take and hold territory you also have to take steps to improve the lives of the population at large. You make sure they have food, medical care, security and all the other things that make for a normal life. You start making them believe that their best interest lies in supporting you and not the insurgents reducing their desire to cooperate and the incidences of intimidation. As that happens, the supply of #1 and #2 will slow and eventually stop.
Even an insurgency supported by outside powers cannot continue operations in those circumstances. There just has to be the willpower to see the operation through to the end, which can takes years if not decades.
Without deviation, the only insurgencies that have failed in the last 100 years, have been those that either never had the support of the populace or who lost that support.
If you're not willing to go through with the above, then you have to pull your forces out ASAP because you won't win.
Where you go off the rails is the assumption that your forces are there to wipe out the insurgents. That tactic is what the Russians tried and thats part of what got their ass kicked. Its also the same reason we got sent packing from Vietnam. You don't squash an insurgency, you squeeze it, you suffocate it.
You have to drop that thinking in order to to turn the strengths of an insurgency into weaknesses and prevail. Namely you have to play off the fact that an insurgency can not engage a conventional force in a head on engagement and win.
All military operations require several key ingredients.
1. Men
2. weaponry and supplies
3. Room to maneuver
From Ceasar's Legions up to a modern armored division, every fighting force in the history of mankind has needed those 3 ingredients to wage battle.
The 10:1 ratio allows the conventional force to take and hold territory as there's precious little the smaller insurgent force can do. As I said before, by definition, an insurgency isn't strong enough to fight in a head on full out battle and retake the territory. Holding territory denies the insurgency #3. Without the ability to maneuver freely and openly, you lose the ability to organize significant attacks, severely reducing the impact of the insurgency. This allows for the next part of the process.
For the most part insurgencies get #1 and #2 from the populace at large, either through cooperation or intimidation. As you take and hold territory you also have to take steps to improve the lives of the population at large. You make sure they have food, medical care, security and all the other things that make for a normal life. You start making them believe that their best interest lies in supporting you and not the insurgents reducing their desire to cooperate and the incidences of intimidation. As that happens, the supply of #1 and #2 will slow and eventually stop.
Even an insurgency supported by outside powers cannot continue operations in those circumstances. There just has to be the willpower to see the operation through to the end, which can takes years if not decades.
Without deviation, the only insurgencies that have failed in the last 100 years, have been those that either never had the support of the populace or who lost that support.
If you're not willing to go through with the above, then you have to pull your forces out ASAP because you won't win.
One of the perks of my job is I get to hobnob with current and former special forces types. Some of the smartest guys I've ever come across. You can learn quite a bit just listening to them for half an hour.
Whats gotten screwy is the shift in terms such that insurgent = Taliban. Thats not always the case and thats something our commanders are starting to realize.
There are apparently anywhere from 6-12 different groups of insurgents that are collectively known as Taliban. Some of them are the religious nuts we booted out in 2001. A lot of them are current and former warlords, more than a few of which we used to fight alongside, who are none too happy that they're losing power with the institution of the formal centralized gov't.
The religious nuts will probably never come around but the rest could probably be persuaded to quit fighting for the right incentives, we just have to be able to give them....
Whats gotten screwy is the shift in terms such that insurgent = Taliban. Thats not always the case and thats something our commanders are starting to realize.
There are apparently anywhere from 6-12 different groups of insurgents that are collectively known as Taliban. Some of them are the religious nuts we booted out in 2001. A lot of them are current and former warlords, more than a few of which we used to fight alongside, who are none too happy that they're losing power with the institution of the formal centralized gov't.
The religious nuts will probably never come around but the rest could probably be persuaded to quit fighting for the right incentives, we just have to be able to give them....
Leananshee
Active Member
What they need to do is go all out or get out. Bomb the poppy fields with rock salt, cut off the Taliban's main source of revenue. Anything else I'd say would just be repeating Nova, so I'll stop at that.
tim :eek
tim :eek
I'm pretty sure those numbers include non-combat troops. The numbers nova is referring to are strictly for the ratio of combatants to combatants. Air bases are a good example of what I'm talking about: it takes hundreds of people to run a large one around the clock, and those people aren't actively engaging the enemy. They get counted as troops in theater, but they aren't participating in combat so it skews the numbers.
78,875Threads
2,185,391Messages
4,959Members