Dealing With Pakistan
By H.D.S. Greenway
Boston Globe
December 21, 2010
’Tis the season to bash Pakistan. That’s the message that leapt from the Obama administration’s Afghan strategy review last week. It’s Pakistan fault that we Americans are not winning the war, so we better get tough with Pakistan.
We “will continue to insist to Pakistani leaders that terrorists safe havens within their borders must be dealt with,” said President Obama. Others, such as retired Gen. Jack Keane, put it more bluntly: “Don’t just put a finger in their chest, put a fist in their chest.” But the message is the same — “U.S. Will Widen War On Militants Inside Pakistan,” headlined the New York Times. “Pentagon Planning More Attacks With Drones And Commandos.”
There can be no doubt of what the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adm. Mike Mullen, called — in Pentagon-speak — “the criticality of Pakistan in terms of overall success.” But is putting a fist in Pakistan’s chest really going to solve the “criticality” issue?
Pakistan is already permitting drone attacks on its territory — attacks that kill as many or more civilians than militants. It has also allowed limited U.S. special operations within Pakistan. Eighty percent of U.S. war material passes through Pakistan. Put a fist in Pakistan’s chest, as we did in September when a cross-border operation killed three Pakistani soldiers, and you may see some of this support dry up.
I recently drove past the hulks of burned out oil tankers by the side of the Grand Trunk Road headed to the Khyber Pass, torched by militants when Pakistan temporarily halted the convoys in retaliation for our incursion.
One might ask General Keane: What is it you don’t understand about closing the Khyber Pass? What chance would you give either the short-term or long-term sustainability of our Afghan effort without Pakistani cooperation? One hundred dollars worth of gasoline passing through Pakistan costs one thousand to ship though Central Asia.
So let’s stop all this talk of cleaning out the sanctuaries ourselves if the Pakistanis won’t. The United States doesn’t need to get involved militarily in another Muslim country.
The U.S. is extremely unpopular as it is with the Pakistani public. Do we really think we could prevail in the mountains of the Northwest Frontier with the whole countryside up in arms against us? If you really want to destabilize a nuclear-armed Pakistan, that would be the best way to do it.
Pakistanis feel, with some justification, that they are being scapegoated. “I’m not saying we are entirely innocent,” a member of Pakistan’s intelligence service told me, but after nine years of failing in Afghanistan it is easy to “put all the blame on someone else.”
Or as Lt. Gen. Asif Malik, commander of the Pakistani Army 11th Corps responsible for the tribal territories, told me: Organizations such as the Haqqani group are not completely dependent on Pakistani territory. They, and the rest of the Taliban, can operate quite well in Afghanistan without sanctuaries — to which the deterioration of security in northern Afghanistan attests.
And from Pakistan’s point of view, there are Taliban attacking Pakistani soldiers from safe havens in Afghanistan that NATO cannot stop. The frontier with Pakistan will always be porous. The mountainous border cannot be sealed completely.
Yes, Pakistan wants to keep some Pashtun guerilla groups close as a hedge against the future. General Keane says that once we show Pakistan that the Taliban cannot come back to power in Kabul, Pakistan will abandon these groups and get on the team.
But Pakistan’s Afghan policy is consistent. It does not want a hostile neighbor on its western border. Pakistan fears the present Kabul government, dominated by the India-backed Northern Alliance of Tajiks and Uzbeks, unless more pro-Pakistan Pashtuns are better represented.
How can Pakistan be confident that the United States will be able to turn security over to an Afghan Army by 2014? Afghan soldiers regularly loot the properties of the very citizens they are tasked with defending, and the Karzai government is unloved. Although there has been much progress in training the Afghan Army, serious training began only last year. My tennis game can show a lot of improvement in one year, but it doesn’t mean I will be ready to play Roger Federer by 2014.
Pakistanis know that, whether it be 2014 or 2024, Americans will go home, and Pakistan will still be left with Afghanistan next door.
The Obama administration understands the need to work closely with Pakistan, and yes, Pakistan can be endlessly frustrating — even to Pakistanis. But more emphasis on trying to understand Pakistan’s vital national interests — some “strategic patience,” as Admiral Mullen put it, and a little less bullying — might be more productive. Too often, the American attitude is master to servant: We give you money now do what we say, and do it right now.
By H.D.S. Greenway
Boston Globe
December 21, 2010
’Tis the season to bash Pakistan. That’s the message that leapt from the Obama administration’s Afghan strategy review last week. It’s Pakistan fault that we Americans are not winning the war, so we better get tough with Pakistan.
We “will continue to insist to Pakistani leaders that terrorists safe havens within their borders must be dealt with,” said President Obama. Others, such as retired Gen. Jack Keane, put it more bluntly: “Don’t just put a finger in their chest, put a fist in their chest.” But the message is the same — “U.S. Will Widen War On Militants Inside Pakistan,” headlined the New York Times. “Pentagon Planning More Attacks With Drones And Commandos.”
There can be no doubt of what the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adm. Mike Mullen, called — in Pentagon-speak — “the criticality of Pakistan in terms of overall success.” But is putting a fist in Pakistan’s chest really going to solve the “criticality” issue?
Pakistan is already permitting drone attacks on its territory — attacks that kill as many or more civilians than militants. It has also allowed limited U.S. special operations within Pakistan. Eighty percent of U.S. war material passes through Pakistan. Put a fist in Pakistan’s chest, as we did in September when a cross-border operation killed three Pakistani soldiers, and you may see some of this support dry up.
I recently drove past the hulks of burned out oil tankers by the side of the Grand Trunk Road headed to the Khyber Pass, torched by militants when Pakistan temporarily halted the convoys in retaliation for our incursion.
One might ask General Keane: What is it you don’t understand about closing the Khyber Pass? What chance would you give either the short-term or long-term sustainability of our Afghan effort without Pakistani cooperation? One hundred dollars worth of gasoline passing through Pakistan costs one thousand to ship though Central Asia.
So let’s stop all this talk of cleaning out the sanctuaries ourselves if the Pakistanis won’t. The United States doesn’t need to get involved militarily in another Muslim country.
The U.S. is extremely unpopular as it is with the Pakistani public. Do we really think we could prevail in the mountains of the Northwest Frontier with the whole countryside up in arms against us? If you really want to destabilize a nuclear-armed Pakistan, that would be the best way to do it.
Pakistanis feel, with some justification, that they are being scapegoated. “I’m not saying we are entirely innocent,” a member of Pakistan’s intelligence service told me, but after nine years of failing in Afghanistan it is easy to “put all the blame on someone else.”
Or as Lt. Gen. Asif Malik, commander of the Pakistani Army 11th Corps responsible for the tribal territories, told me: Organizations such as the Haqqani group are not completely dependent on Pakistani territory. They, and the rest of the Taliban, can operate quite well in Afghanistan without sanctuaries — to which the deterioration of security in northern Afghanistan attests.
And from Pakistan’s point of view, there are Taliban attacking Pakistani soldiers from safe havens in Afghanistan that NATO cannot stop. The frontier with Pakistan will always be porous. The mountainous border cannot be sealed completely.
Yes, Pakistan wants to keep some Pashtun guerilla groups close as a hedge against the future. General Keane says that once we show Pakistan that the Taliban cannot come back to power in Kabul, Pakistan will abandon these groups and get on the team.
But Pakistan’s Afghan policy is consistent. It does not want a hostile neighbor on its western border. Pakistan fears the present Kabul government, dominated by the India-backed Northern Alliance of Tajiks and Uzbeks, unless more pro-Pakistan Pashtuns are better represented.
How can Pakistan be confident that the United States will be able to turn security over to an Afghan Army by 2014? Afghan soldiers regularly loot the properties of the very citizens they are tasked with defending, and the Karzai government is unloved. Although there has been much progress in training the Afghan Army, serious training began only last year. My tennis game can show a lot of improvement in one year, but it doesn’t mean I will be ready to play Roger Federer by 2014.
Pakistanis know that, whether it be 2014 or 2024, Americans will go home, and Pakistan will still be left with Afghanistan next door.
The Obama administration understands the need to work closely with Pakistan, and yes, Pakistan can be endlessly frustrating — even to Pakistanis. But more emphasis on trying to understand Pakistan’s vital national interests — some “strategic patience,” as Admiral Mullen put it, and a little less bullying — might be more productive. Too often, the American attitude is master to servant: We give you money now do what we say, and do it right now.
